

**From:** [Doris Brooke](#)  
**To:** [LNGStudy](#)  
**Subject:** 2012 LNG Export Study  
**Date:** Thursday, January 24, 2013 4:05:31 PM  
**Attachments:** [2012 LNG Export Study 2.pdf](#)  
[2012 LNG Export Study 3.pdf](#)  
[2012 LNG Export Study 1.pdf](#)

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*Please see the attached documents.  
Thank you,*

*Doris Brooke*  
Administrative Coordinator

***REMEMBER THE RIVER*** - *To remind us all to Remember the River in every decision we make; And to hold our elected officials accountable to do the same.*

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925 Canal Street, Suite 3701  
Bristol, PA 19007  
215-369-1188  
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Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail  
[www.delawarerivervoices.blogspot.com](http://www.delawarerivervoices.blogspot.com)

U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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Respectfully,

jill wiener

p  
C [REDACTED] 4

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Shelly Homer



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sara hart

A black rectangular redaction box covering the signature area.

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Patti Rossetti



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Kari Murante



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Jan Tyniec



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Cheryl Dzubak

[REDACTED]

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michael haleta

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It is incumbent upon DOE to consider these ignored economic and environmental costs in determining whether LNG export to non-free trade agreement nations fulfills the public interest standard set forth under the Natural Gas Act.

Respectfully,

Thomas Loftus

A solid black rectangular redaction box covering the signature area.

U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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Shale gas development presents an unparalleled level of harm to drinking water, air quality, food supplies, and public health that equate to high economic burdens for the United States economy and taxpayers. These are economic burdens that any accurate assessment of the impacts of LNG exports must fully explore and consider.

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Investing in increasing shale gas development including exports brings with it high opportunity costs for this country also ignored by the DOE report. Investment in LNG and shale gas development means there is not investment in truly sustainable energy development, in corresponding quality infrastructure for sustainable energy, in the technological advancements necessary to ensure U.S. leadership in renewable energy sources, and in the use of taxpayer dollars for achieving other high priority job creation and economic advancement goals. These tangible costs were IGNORED by DOE's study.

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The DOE needs to honestly consider these ignored economic and environmental costs in determining whether LNG export to non-free trade agreement nations fulfills the public interest standard set forth under the Natural Gas Act.

Respectfully,

Emily Ginder

Emily Ginder  
[REDACTED]

U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

FRACKING IS NOT SAFE AND SHOULD BE BANNED, NOT EXPANDED TO ALLOW MORE PROFITS FOR GREEDY, RECKLESS DRILLERS. METHANE GAS EXCAPES AND IS DENSER THAN DIRTY COAL CAUSING FURTHER CLIMATE CHANGE - 80,000 lbs OF TOXIC, CANCER CAUSING CHEMICALS FOR EACH WELL WITH 1M GALLONS OF PRISTINE STREAM WATER FOR EACH WELL. WITH TENS OF THOUSANDS OF WELLS, THAT IS A LOT OF HAZARDOUS WASTEWATER THAT IS GOING WHERE? INJECT IT INTO THE EARTH AND CAUSE EARTHQUAKES? LET'S GET REAL - WE DO NOT WANT THIS METHOD OF EXTRACTION AND NEITHER SHOULD YOU.

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Respectfully,

Mary Leitch



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
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Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Respectfully,

Julie and Rich



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
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Respectfully,

Robert Moore



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Respectfully,

Al Benner



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Respectfully,

Shannon Pendleton



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I thought the purpose of exploiting US shale gas was to make us energy independent? Exploiting this gas for export further adds to global warming and will destroy our water supply and cause untold suffering of cancer, respiratory disease and destruction of farmland, and recreational tourism for the profits of the rich oil and gas companies. Gas terminals around the world will become a terrorist target. This gas is not needed by the U.S. or the world for our energy needs. You should read the Nov. 2009 issue of Scientific American before anymore fossil fuel extraction or shipment in the United States. Jacobson and Delucchi have laid out a plan for converting the world to renewable energy without fossil fuel or nuclear power, with existing technology by 2030. Germany will obtain 80% of its energy with renewable sources by 2016 and phase out its nuclear power plants by 2022. If Germany can do this, we can to.

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Respectfully,

Paul Roden

Paul Roden  


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Respectfully,

tari pantaleo



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
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Respectfully,

Susan Sullivan



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:

Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

PLEASE DO NOT ACT IN HASTE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT TESTING. DO NOT LET THE GAS LOBBY SUBVERT THE PUBLIC HEALTH OF OUR CITIZENS. WHERE IS YOUR SELF-RESPECT??? YOUR RESPECT FOR US?

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Respectfully, Daniel A. Harris

Daniel A. Harris  


U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Respectfully,

Eric Bare



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Michael W Evans



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
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david benner



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kurt bauereiss



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Susan VanMeter



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I do not want the permits for export of LNG to be approved.

The **consultants who did the study have strong industry ties** that puts their credibility into question. Their analysis was narrow and simplistic, without considering the external costs. The exporting of LNG would **intensify the pace of shale gas extraction and processing**. The current pace of unwelcome, unexpected extraction is already more than the people - who are unfortunate enough to find themselves living above gas infused shale - can bear.

High volume slickwater hydraulic fracturing (HVSWHF), colloquially known as 'fracking' - the process that has made retrieval of shale gas possible - is different from other industrial processes, which are concentrated in areas set aside for that purpose and zoned industrial. HVSWHF takes place in communities - near homes, schools, hospitals - in farms, parks, forests and ecologically sensitive areas. External costs are thus imposed upon the community - such as property devaluation, infrastructure damage, community cohesion de solution, skyrocketing rental costs, and corruption of the political process by the money and power of the industry. Public health impacts are wide spread and well known, yet under reported and unstudied.

**We do not have the scientific studies** to show whether the natural environment is able to maintain its integrity amidst the current extensive extraction processes, let alone an increased, unmitigated further rush. HVSWHF is extremely complex, inherently risky, and inadequately studied for its environmental impacts. It is poorly regulated - at both the state and federal level - and the regulations are often not enforced. **Monitoring is sorely lacking**, since there are thousands of wells everywhere, in various stages of development.

Water withdrawals impact streams, aquatic life, wetlands and riparian areas. Water wells, ground water, ponds and the land itself have been contaminated. Forests may never recover from their fragmentation, loss of large trees (and their carbon sequestration), loss of animal habitat, the introduction of invasive species and the loss of biodiversity.

Air quality is negatively affected not only by the actual drilling but by the many processing stations. The diesel pollution from thousands of trucks is both a public health risk and a global warming contributor. The sand used in the process is a silicosis risk for the communities where it is mined and processed and for the workers.

The negative long-term economic effects of a boom - bust cycle on communities by extractive industries is well documented throughout history. Ultimately the community ends up less healthy and wealthy after the resource is depleted and the industry leaves.

The negative impacts on other industries such as agriculture, tourism, outdoor recreation, etc. must be taken into consideration in an economic analysis.

The pipelines that were built to take the gas from the current IMPORT terminals to the end users in the U.S. were built where ever the gas companies wanted them irrespective of property rights - with the use of **eminent domain**. Eminent domain is only granted for the purpose of the public good - not for the financial benefit of private industry. Therefore, it should be illegal to use those pipelines to transmit gas from the fields to the terminal for EXPORT - which **benefits only the industry**.

Liquifying, transporting, regassifying and then transporting gas to end users in other countries is an energy intensive process that **makes no sense** whatsoever in a world that needs to address climate change YESTERDAY.

NASA Climate Scientist James Hansen has said that if we have any chance of avoiding the civilization threatening effects of climate change that are heading our way, the fossil fuels that are still in the ground must stay there. We should be encouraging the development of renewable energy, not the use of every last drop of fossil fuel.

Respectfully,

Julie Edgar





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Respectfully,

Bonnie Steelman



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Richard Voldstad



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Respectfully,

Marjorie Nailor



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Respectfully,

Catherine Smith



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diane bonanno



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
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Respectfully,

Bruce Byker James



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Vicki DaSilva



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Jennifer Foulk



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Lisa Rochelle



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
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Respectfully,

carol jagiello



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
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Respectfully,

GM



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Respectfully,

Dorothy Flippen



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Susan Shaak



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
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Wanda Skalba



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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
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Why would we want to contaminate water that is the source for millions of Americans, contribute to the greenhouse gas problem causing climate change, and risk our health so that energy companies can rake in more obscene profits selling OUR GAS overseas? It makes no sense whatsoever except to those reaping the profit. And those they pay off.

Respectfully,

Kathleen Maher



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Respectfully,

Keith Parsons



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Jill Becker



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


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Respectfully,

A solid black rectangular redaction box covering the signature area.

U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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Respectfully,

Leslie Stephens



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
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Respectfully,

Diane L. Dilendik



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
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Respectfully,

Sue Devine



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
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Respectfully,

Elizabeth Norris



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Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

Approving export of liquified natural gas will only promote more natural gas drilling and fracking in the United States. Multinational corporations will tear through our rural communities in search of natural gas that will bring higher prices abroad than at home and leave our communities in tatters.

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Respectfully,

Jennifer Clark



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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
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Respectfully,

Pamela Check



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Wanda Crain



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Smara Voglesong



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
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Respectfully,

Tara Holmes



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Audrey Gozdiskowski



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
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Respectfully,

Natasha Jordan



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
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Barbara J. Hassan



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
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Brenda Norris



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
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Respectfully,

charlotte rau



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
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Eric Boyce



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
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John



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
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mary colvard



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Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
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Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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
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Respectfully,

John Bartsch



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
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Respectfully,

Lane Sharman



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Furthermore, the public was first told that fracking was needed for sustainable supply, now we have the capacity to export the surplus. What the \*\*\*\*\*? Are you also going to export the contaminated water or are you going to stick us with that?

I would like to propose, the people engaged in fracking must live within 1/4 mile of a well. It's time for the people who profit from this practice to prove their faith in the so called facts they promote.

Respectfully,  
Patricia Kuc

patricia kuc



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
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Respectfully,

Deborah Hicks



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Diane B Carroll



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Leese Walker



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
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Respectfully,

Karen Berry



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Respectfully,

Victoria Lesser



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Respectfully,

susan meyer



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Gabrielle Engh



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Anthony Hall



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John Jonik



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
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Respectfully,

Charna Eisner



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Jill A. Leighty



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Daniel Beck



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
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Respectfully,

wayne and angel smith



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
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It is incumbent upon DOE to consider these ignored economic and environmental costs in determining whether LNG export to non-free trade agreement nations fulfills the public interest standard set forth under the Natural Gas Act.

Respectfully,

Walt Hug



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:

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Respectfully,

Douglas Tedeschi



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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
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Respectfully,  
Matthew ONeill

Matthew ONeill



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for achieving other high priority job creation and economic advancement goals. This plan disincentivizes investments in energy efficiency, energy reductions, and truly green energy research and development. These tangible costs were ignored by DOE's study.

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
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Respectfully,  
Heather Cantino



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Carol L. Kennedy



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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
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Respectfully,

Agnes Raeder



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
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Respectfully,

Alisha Dubb



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Respectfully,

Peter Alsop



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Please consider closely a more accurate scope of needed information before this can be considered--Fracking is really harmful to the environment--once we ruin the local water and air, there is no turning back--and to use it for export is to add insult to injury. PLEASE pay more attention The economic impacts and energy policy ramifications of LNG export far exceed the limited scope of consideration presented in the Department of Energy's ("DOE") report: "Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets".

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
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It is incumbent upon DOE to consider these ignored economic and environmental costs in determining whether LNG export to non-free trade agreement nations fulfills the public interest standard set forth under the Natural Gas Act.

Respectfully,

ellen weaver



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:

Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

To Whom It May Concern:

WE are supposed to be moving toward sustainable, renewable resources for energy- to try and save what's left of the environment, you know the space we NEED to exist? The DOE fails to address this MAJOR issue, let alone the secondary, negative economic ramifications of exporting LNG in their "Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets" report.

Any authorizations to export LNG will directly and dramatically INCREASE the level of shale gas development in this country, including development of supporting industries and infrastructure, while putting the US population in serious jeopardy of their health and welfare. Therefore any credible LNG economic study, particularly one purporting to be a "cumulative impacts study," must include analysis of the wealth of harms associated directly and indirectly with the increasing shale gas development that will be supported and incited by LNG exports.

Shale gas development presents an UNACCEPTABLE level of harm to drinking water, air quality, food supplies, and public health that equate to high economic burdens for the United States economy and taxpayers. One has to ask themselves if the people who wrote this study are truly sane, or even living on the same planet as the rest of us. Just how deep does the corruption of this government agency run?

Shale gas development and its infrastructure is an environmental NIGHTMARE- Remember THE ENVIRONMENT? I think I mentioned this earlier- THE PLACE HUMANS NEED IF THEY WANT TO CONTINUE TO EXIST. LNG will support, induce and encourage more shale gas development it will increase these harms and the associated costs.

Investment in LNG and shale gas development means there is not investment in truly sustainable energy development, in corresponding quality infrastructure for sustainable energy, in the technological advancements necessary to ensure U.S. leadership in renewable energy sources, and in the use of taxpayer dollars for achieving other high priority job creation and economic advancement goals. These tangible costs were ignored by DOE's study.

Scientific research and data increasingly support the proposition that shale gas development - when combined with LNG export - is a net greenhouse gas polluter worse than coal. To the extent that authorizing LNG export will induce and encourage more shale gas development - and therefore more methane and CO2 emissions exacerbating climate change - it will be increasing the costs associated with responding to, and rebuilding from, the extreme weather events that will inevitably result. Examination of these foreseeable costs were likewise absent in DOE's study.



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We DEMAND the DOE to consider these ignored economic and environmental costs in determining whether LNG export to non-free trade agreement nations fulfills the public interest standard set forth under the Natural Gas Act.

Albert Crudo



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

Fracking is a toxic threat to American communities and the climate. Allowing fracked gas exports would dramatically increase the scale of and demand for fracking in the United States by giving the fossil fuel industry access to huge foreign markets. Stand up to the fossil fuel industry and deny all applications to export natural gas.


I think one of my most basic feelings is that with wind, solar and geothermal energy, we don't have nearly these same issues. We are not debating the lesser evil of injecting benzene, toluene, arsenic, lead mercury and other carcinogens and endocrine disruptors or treating it in waste water plants; if these chemicals contaminate groundwater during any of the drilling process; what to do with substantial 1-5 millions of gallons) freshwater withdrawals per frack; if there are air quality issues do to voc emissions; what to do when the drilling boom is over (we still will need energy and now we will have towns with infrastructure to support drilling and no drillers left to occupy it) We should be building the infrastructure to support renewables. The University of Delaware has shown that the US can be powered 90-99% of the time with a combination of solar and wind and storage options, at costs comparable with fossil fuel and nuclear mix used today.

<http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2013/01/renewable-energy-solution>

Put an end to this debate and focus on a real green energy solution.

Respectfully,

Erin crump





U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Respectfully,

seth feinberg



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Respectfully,

Gregory Dickson



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Respectfully,

Wilson L Sproehnle III



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
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Respectfully,

Susan Ferrandiz



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:

Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

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Please do not trash our great country to send this stuff to China or other potential enemies in a war. This reminds me of the 1930s when we sent scrap metal to Japan. Then the Nips used this against us to kill many of our Marines on Guadalcanal and Tawara. Oh yes I must remember Pearl Harbor.

Please show your patriotism and stop this program.

Respectfully,

Frank Hill



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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
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Respectfully,

Edgar Mitchell



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Respectfully,

David Ira Kagan



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Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

I urge you to consider carefully what is being proposed to export LNG, and how this work will impact those communities, the land, and the environment on a whole where it will be developed. I have been reading more and more studies showing the detrimental effects of shale gas exploration, and I cannot with a clear conscience sign onto this type of energy production. Please VOTE NO on the exporting of LNG to other countries!

The economic impacts and energy policy ramifications of LNG export far exceed the limited scope of consideration presented in the Department of Energy's ("DOE") report: "Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets".

Any authorizations to export LNG will directly and dramatically affect the level of shale gas development in this country, including development of supporting industries and infrastructure. Therefore any credible LNG economic study, particularly one purporting to be a "cumulative impacts study," must include analysis of the wealth of harms associated directly and indirectly with the increasing shale gas development that will be supported and incited by LNG exports.

Shale gas development presents an unparalleled level of harm to drinking water, air quality, food supplies, and public health that equate to high economic burdens for the United States economy and taxpayers. These are economic burdens that any accurate assessment of the impacts of LNG exports must fully explore and consider.

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Furthermore, scientific research and data increasingly support the proposition that shale gas development - when combined with LNG export - is a net greenhouse gas polluter as potent as coal, and likely worse. To the extent that authorizing LNG export will induce and encourage more shale gas development - and therefore more methane and CO2 emissions exacerbating climate change - it will be increasing the costs associated with responding to, and rebuilding from, the extreme weather events that will inevitably result. Examination of these foreseeable costs were likewise absent in DOE's study.

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Respectfully,  
Diane M. Lesher  
Santee, CA

Diane M. Lesher



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:

Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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Respectfully,

Margaret Wood



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: Request for Comment with Regard to LNG Export Study

Good day-

My name is Daniel Allard, an American born citizen, and I am writing today against the exports of LNG which supports high volume slickwater hydraulic fracturing. This process is destructive in more ways than it is worth not only to our subterranean resources but to our atmospheric and carbon footprint as a whole. It is not a question of whether or not these processes are having an effect on climate change and our economic stalemate, it is a matter of when are the right people going to listen and make change. Contaminating our fellow citizen's groundwater, a basic human right so many are obviously taking for granted, was not enough apparently.

This country prides itself on innovation and standing out strong above every other country in the world yet our political corruption and lack of tenacity to stand up to oil industries continues to encourage this old world and VERY short term mindset that is keeping our country stuck. Keep doing the same thing, why would it change? We absolutely have the intelligence, able minds and bodies, technology and resources to come up with the next great SUSTAINABLE energy solution. Many have already been proven and are ready for production.

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Respectfully,

Daniel Allard



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Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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
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Respectfully,

Roger



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Washington, DC 20026-4375

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
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Respectfully,

Henry Berkowitz



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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Respectfully,

Diane MacInnes

[REDACTED]

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Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
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
Subject: Permit Requests for Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas from 19 Terminals that are Currently Used for Import Only

To Whom it May Concern in the DOE,

I am strongly asking you to stop the proceedings that would permit the exporting of liquefied natural gas from 19 terminals that are currently being used for import only. The study conducted was not a comprehensive study and omitted the cumulative health impacts of exposure to the hazardous vapors from not only the fracking process but also the processing of these extractive gases that are harmful to the environment, people's health, people's water supplies (both public and private) and air contamination. Unfortunately, the study's scope only focused on the economic benefits to the U.S. economy, the U.S. trade balance, the industry and the natural gas leaseholders. Aquifers are not replaceable. Contaminated rivers that supply public drinking water, slowly and then more rapidly affect public health and put more strain on the health care systems. If this industry could be truly believed that this gas would make us "energy independent", then why are they now asking to export this gas to other countries. There is something really afoul here and it must be addressed by not allowing the permitting of the exporting of this natural gas to other countries.

Respectfully,

Michele Bertini





U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
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Anne MacDougall



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
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Dina Ghen



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
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Respectfully,

William Henry



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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Respectfully,

Dianne Arnold

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THEY MAKE THE PROFITS, WE GET THE CANCERS - CHILDREN TOO!

Respectfully,

Mary Leitch







U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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
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Respectfully,

Susan B DeSantis



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
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Erin Stolz



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
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Karen Lefkovitz



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
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Andrew Grinberg



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
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
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To Whom It May Concern:

Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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Investing in increasing shale gas development including exports brings with it high opportunity costs for this country also ignored by the DOE report. Investment in LNG and shale gas development means there is not investment in truly sustainable energy development, in corresponding quality infrastructure for sustainable energy, in the technological advancements necessary to ensure U.S. leadership in renewable energy sources, and in the use of taxpayer dollars for achieving other high priority job creation and economic advancement goals. These tangible costs were ignored by DOE's study.


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It is incumbent upon DOE to consider these ignored economic and environmental costs in determining whether LNG export to non-free trade agreement nations fulfills the public interest standard set forth under the Natural Gas Act.

Respectfully,

ER Curtis



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
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
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Respectfully,

Connie Stomper



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
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
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Respectfully,

jan baty



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Jeanne-Marie Kreuzer

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
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Respectfully,

Larry Mulvihill



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
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Ann Gomez



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
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Susan Righi



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Nancy Lipshitz



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Respectfully,

Dena Barbara



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
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Thomas M Yatsonsky



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
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Respectfully, Bruce P. Loigman

Bruce



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
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candido rodriguez



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Karen Bagdes-Canning



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William Meyer  
Vice Chair, Sierra Club, Lower Hudson Group  
Conservation Co-Chair  
Atlantic Chapter Delegate

William Meyer



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
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Terri supowitz



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melvin whipple



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
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Respectfully,

Ann Dixon



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

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
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Jon Levin



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
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Julie Hajdusek



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Jean Withrow



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Alex Sim



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
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Respectfully,

premillia dixit nag



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
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Brian S. Waite



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**REJECT PERMITS FOR LNG EXPORT UNTIL SCIENCE CLEARLY SHOWS THAT  
FRACKING CAN BE MADE SAFE!!**

Neutral third-party scientists must study the impacts of fracking on public health (air, water, land - on farms, in parks, at schools, in our homes and hospitals).

You would NEVER let a surgeon operate on you unless apprised of specific health information!!

You would never let a lawyer represent you in court without the facts!!

Astronauts would never fly in a rocket previously untested!!

You would never go up with a pilot who knew as little about flying as the gas industry knows about fracking!!

Gas industry insiders are intoxicated with dreams of massive wealth - they seem to forget that they, too, breathe air, drink water, and need an inhabitable planet to live on.

Wind and solar do not pollute. They are far safer options than staying with fossil fuel. Such claims that turbines kill birds (fact - at a rate 1% of our building windows!!) are distractions - as if the industry really cares about birds. If we focused on getting Americans to use LESS POWER (certainly not what the power industry wants!) - we could reduce CO2 by 30% within a month!!

Do you really feel confident that the gas industry ought to go blindly into the night without a map - before we can trust that they are thinking about the public good?? Once we have a ravaged environment - we can't get a clean one back.

Natural gas ought to be a stop-gap measure to help U.S. security by allowing us to become energy independent (once we know what we are doing - and there is a LOT of information that shows that we DO NOT) - NOT for the enrichment of the industry with exports.

**SLOOOOWWWWW DOOOOOWWWWNNNNN!** Take a breath. Think. It's a Pandora's Box!  
Let science be the guide. Measure twice before you cut once!

L. Matthew Schwartz, MD







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Shale gas development presents an unparalleled level of harm to drinking water, air quality, food supplies, and public health that equate to high economic burdens for the United States economy and taxpayers. These are economic burdens that any accurate assessment of the impacts of LNG exports must fully explore and consider.

Shale gas development and its infrastructure induces or contributes to deforestation, land compaction, wetlands destruction, and increased earthquake potential, as well as creates increased potential for flooding and erosion of public and private lands that must be responded to and addressed by homeowners, communities and local, state and federal governments. To the extent that LNG will support, induce and encourage more shale gas development it will be increasing these harms and the associated costs; as such these costs must be considered in any credible analysis of the economic ramifications of LNG.

The most recent estimates of economically recoverable shale gas reserves estimate approximately 20-40 years of supply at current domestic consumption. Increasing LNG exports will reduce the timeline of this supply. As a result all of the hundreds of billions invested in transforming this country's energy infrastructure into one dependent on shale gas will quickly be lost as the quickly dwindling shale gas supply will necessitate the need for a new energy infrastructure. Upon depleting its shale gas reserves in just a matter of decades, America will be faced with an abrupt and expensive shift to new energy sources and corresponding infrastructure. This 20-40 year timeline becomes further abbreviated if LNG exports occur.

Investing in increasing shale gas development including exports brings with it high opportunity costs for this country also ignored by the DOE report. Investment in LNG and shale gas development means there is not investment in truly sustainable energy development, in corresponding quality infrastructure for sustainable energy, in the technological advancements necessary to ensure U.S. leadership in renewable energy sources, and in the use of taxpayer dollars for achieving other high priority job creation and economic advancement goals. These tangible costs were ignored by DOE's study.

Furthermore, scientific research and data increasingly support the proposition that shale gas development - when combined with LNG export - is a net greenhouse gas polluter as potent as coal, and likely worse. To the extent that authorizing LNG export will induce and encourage more shale gas development - and therefore more methane and CO2 emissions exacerbating climate change - it will be increasing the costs associated with responding to, and rebuilding from, the extreme weather events that will inevitably result. Examination of these foreseeable costs were likewise absent in DOE's study.


The 2012 LNG Export Study's failure to examine the aforementioned and other relevant costs in its analyses renders the report a superficial and stunted picture of LNG's economic ramifications. DOE's study simply fails to provide decisionmakers the complete, accurate knowledge necessary to render an informed decision.

It is incumbent upon DOE to consider these ignored economic and environmental costs in determining whether LNG export to non-free trade agreement nations fulfills the public interest standard set forth under the Natural Gas Act.

Respectfully,

Respectfully,  
Sarah Lowry

sarah lowry



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:

Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)

Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

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May I add exporting Natural Gas means exporting shale gas. There are unfortunate externalities of people who are negatively impacted. Here is an example:

John Trallo has sent me this heart-rending account of what his community in a rural community in Sullivan County, PA has become since fracking arrived. His personal experience adds substance to what the statistics tell us.

It's so ironic. I moved here from the metropolitan Philadelphia area to live my life creatively in a quiet, and peaceful setting. Sonestown, isn't even really a town. It's not incorporated, it has no elected officials, and is considered by Sullivan County, a village. Sonestown was a tiny victorian village that had a population of about 110+/- before the gas industry came. A few families moved away immediately, and a few more after the flood of 2011.

These days, the population has dwindled to about 70, and many of the homes sold have been grabbed up by slumlords and turned into bunk houses for out-of-state gas field workers.

The dramatic cultural shift, and surrounding industrial activity of pipelines, well pads, and compressor stations is nothing less than heartbreaking to watch. Especially living in a home that no longer has potable water. Due to the noise and the dust, we can't even open our windows in the spring and summer months.

Another downside is the area's loss of tourism, agriculture, and new home construction jobs. These were the economic mainstays in Sullivan County for the last one-hundred years. Many of the family owned restaurants, camp grounds, Bed & Breakfast, and farms have disappeared. No one wants to vacation, or live in an industrial zone, or stay at a hotel with out-of-state gas field roughnecks, and many farms have been either consumed by well pads, compressor stations, pipelines, and access roads, or destroyed by contamination.

These are local jobs and small businesses that will never return. They're gone forever, and when the gas industry has their infrastructure in place and moves on, there will be nothing left. No farms... no state game lands... no wildlife... no vacation cabins... no jobs... no family businesses... no people. This industry will turn small-town rural America into ghost towns of the shale fields.

The industry calls shale gas development a "game changer". That may be the most accurate claim they make. What they don't tell you is, this is their "game", and the "change" is going to be far worse than anyone can imagine.

-- John Trallo"

What will the government do to make these people who again and the communities healthy. Will the government hold the industry accountable to the extensive damage extreme extraction of gas does to our environment.

Respectfully,  
Margery Schab



U.S. Department of Energy (FE-34)  
Office Natural Gas Reg Activities  
P.O. Box 44375  
Washington, DC 20026-4375

To Whom It May Concern:  
Electronic Submission via: [LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov](mailto:LNGStudy@hq.doe.gov)  
Re: LNG Export Study and Request for Comment

First, we should not be fracking. It pollutes our water. second we should not be exporting energy, that is used locally. There should be efforts to shift away from fossil fuel use and extraction. There should certainly not be extraction and export as our national policy. The economic impacts and energy policy ramifications of LNG export far exceed the limited scope of consideration presented in the Department of Energy's ("DOE") report: "Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets".

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Respectfully,

Theresa Brady

