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BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 4:18 p.m., June 26, 2015  
OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY

**In the Matter of:**

CHENIERE MARKETING, LLC and )  
CORPUS CHRISTI LIQUEFACTION, LLC )

FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG

**MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ANSWER AND  
ANSWER OF CHENIERE MARKETING, LLC AND  
CORPUS CHRISTI LIQUEFACTION, LLC TO  
SIERRA CLUB’S REQUESTS FOR REHEARING AND STAY**

Pursuant to Rules 302 and 505 of the Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) Rules of Practice and Procedure,<sup>1</sup> Cheniere Marketing, LLC (“CMI”) and Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC (“CCL,” and, together with CMI, “Cheniere Corpus Christi”) hereby submit this Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer to Sierra Club’s June 11, 2015, Request for Rehearing,<sup>2</sup> as well as Sierra Club’s request for a stay, of DOE, Office of Fossil Energy’s (“DOE/FE”) May 12, 2015 Final Opinion and Order issued in the above-captioned docket authorizing Cheniere Corpus Christi to export liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) from the proposed Corpus Christi Liquefaction Project (“Project”) to non-Free Trade Agreement nations.<sup>3</sup> Sierra Club’s Rehearing Request fails to overcome the Natural Gas Act’s (“NGA”) well-established presumption that such exports are in the public interest, improperly argues that National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) analyses for the Project were deficient because they failed to consider impacts that are in

<sup>1</sup> 10 C.F.R. §§ 590.302, 590.505 (2015).

<sup>2</sup> Request for Rehearing, *Cheniere Marketing, LLC & Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC*, FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG (June 11, 2015) [hereinafter Rehearing Request].

<sup>3</sup> *Cheniere Marketing, LLC & Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC, Final Opinion and Order Granting Long-Term, Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Proposed Corpus Christi Liquefaction Project to Be Located in Corpus Christi, Texas, to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations*, DOE/FE Order No. 3638, FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG (May 12, 2015) [hereinafter Non-FTA Order].

actuality not cognizable under NEPA, and fails to satisfy the stringent requirements for a stay. The Rehearing Request should be denied in its entirety.

## **I. Introduction**

In August 2012, CMI submitted an application to DOE/FE in the above-captioned docket, seeking authorization under NGA Section 3 to export LNG from the Project to non-Free Trade Agreement nations.<sup>4</sup> Sierra Club sought to intervene in the proceeding on December 26, 2012. The Non-FTA Application was amended to add CCL as an applicant in October 2014.<sup>5</sup>

On the same day that the Non-FTA Application was filed, CCL and its affiliate Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline, L.P. submitted an application to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) seeking authorization under NGA Section 3 to site, construct, and operate the Project, as well as authorization under NGA Section 7 for the construction, ownership, and operation of an associated interstate natural gas pipeline.<sup>6</sup> As the lead agency under NEPA for purposes of NGA Section 3, FERC initially published a Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Assessment for the Project, but ultimately decided to prepare a more detailed Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), with DOE/FE serving as a cooperating

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<sup>4</sup> Application of Cheniere Marketing, LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas to Non-Free Trade Countries, *Cheniere Marketing, LLC*, FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG (Aug. 31, 2012) [hereinafter Non-FTA Application]. Simultaneously, CMI submitted an application for authorization to export LNG to Free Trade Agreement Nations. Application for Long-Term Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas to Free Trade Agreement Countries, *Cheniere Marketing, LLC*, FE Docket No. 12-99-LNG (Aug. 31, 2012). DOE/FE granted the latter application in October 2012. *Cheniere Marketing, LLC, Order Granting Long-Term Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Proposed Corpus Christi Liquefaction Project to Free Trade Agreement Nations*, DOE/FE Order No. 3164, FE Docket No. 12-99-LNG (Oct. 16, 2012).

<sup>5</sup> *Cheniere Marketing, LLC, Order Amending Application in Docket No. 12-97-LNG to Add Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC as Applicant*, DOE/FE Order No. 3538, FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG (Oct. 29, 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Application for Authorizations Under the Natural Gas Act, *Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC & Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline, L.P.*, FERC Docket Nos. CP12-507-000 & CP12-508-000 (Aug. 31, 2012).

agency.<sup>7</sup> Following public comment on a draft EIS, FERC published a final EIS for the Project in October 2014.<sup>8</sup>

During the Non-FTA Application's pendency, DOE/FE released several studies related to its NGA Section 3 "public interest" review. In 2012, it commissioned and issued a two-part "LNG Export Study," in furtherance of its "continuing duty to monitor supply and demand conditions in the United States in order to ensure that authorizations to export LNG do not subsequently lead to a reduction in the supply of natural gas needed to meet essential domestic needs."<sup>9</sup> The first part, conducted by the U.S. Energy Information Administration ("EIA"), was designed "to understand the implications of additional natural gas demand (as exports) on domestic energy markets under various scenarios," which DOE/FE cautioned "were not forecasts of either the ultimate level, or rates of increase, of exports."<sup>10</sup> The EIA found that, "[u]nder the scenarios specified, increased natural gas exports lead to higher domestic natural gas prices, which lead to reduced domestic consumption, and increased domestic production and pipeline imports from Canada," but cautioned that "[t]he projections in this report are not statements of what *will* happen but of what *might* happen, given the assumptions and methodologies used."<sup>11</sup> The EIA Study generally projected the sources of additional domestic natural gas production (with geographically non-specific references to "shale gas, tight gas, coalbed, and other sources"), as well as the sectors in which domestic natural gas consumption would decrease, but cautioned that "projections of energy markets over a 25-year period are highly uncertain and

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<sup>7</sup> See 77 Fed. Reg. 34,034 (June 8, 2012); 79 Fed. Reg. 35,344 (June 20, 2014).

<sup>8</sup> FERC, *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Corpus Christi LNG Project, Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC & Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline, L.P.*, FERC Docket Nos. CP12-507-000 & CP12-508-000 (Oct. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Final EIS]; see 79 Fed. Reg. 62,130 (Oct. 16, 2014).

<sup>9</sup> 77 Fed. Reg. 73,627, 73,628 (Dec. 11, 2012).

<sup>10</sup> *Id.*

<sup>11</sup> EIA, *Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets* 10, ii (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter EIA Study], available at [http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/fe\\_eia\\_lng.pdf](http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/fe_eia_lng.pdf).

subject to many events that cannot be foreseen.”<sup>12</sup> The second part of the LNG Export Study, performed by NERA Economic Consulting, analyzed the “macroeconomic impact of LNG exports on the U.S. economy” under a range of scenarios.<sup>13</sup> It was designed to complement the EIA Study, which had been “limited to the relationship between export levels and domestic prices without considering whether or not those quantities of exports could be sold at high enough world prices to support the calculated domestic prices.”<sup>14</sup> The NERA Report concluded that, “[a]cross all ... scenarios, the U.S. was projected to gain net economic benefits from allowing LNG exports,” and that the highest export-level scenarios—and corresponding prices—considered by the EIA Study were “not likely.”<sup>15</sup> It noted that “U.S. LNG exports provide an opportunity for natural gas producers to realize additional profits by selling incremental volumes of natural gas,” but—like the EIA Study—recognized “great uncertainties about how the U.S. natural gas market will evolve,” one of the “major uncertainties” being “the availability of shale gas in the United States.”<sup>16</sup> The NERA Report explicitly did not consider “the location of additional natural gas production.”<sup>17</sup> In May 2014, CMI supplemented the Non-FTA Application with an update to the NERA Report that found, *inter alia*, that: greater LNG exports and domestic demand can be supported in the U.S. natural gas market at lower prices compared

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<sup>12</sup> *Id.* at 11, 3.

<sup>13</sup> 77 Fed. Reg. at 73,628.

<sup>14</sup> NERA Economic Consulting, *Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports from the United States 3* (Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter NERA Report], available at [http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/nera\\_lng\\_report.pdf](http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/nera_lng_report.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> *Id.* at 1, 9.

<sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 13, 21.

<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 210.

to those presented in the NERA Report; and greater economic benefits would result to the United States at a given level of LNG exports than those estimated in the NERA Report.<sup>18</sup>

More recently, DOE issued two studies in the summer of 2014 that were designed “to provide additional information to the public regarding the potential environmental impacts of unconventional natural gas exploration and production activities,”<sup>19</sup> and to “estimate[] the life cycle [greenhouse gas (‘GHG’)] emissions of U.S. LNG exports to Europe and Asia, compared with alternative supplies, to produce electric power.”<sup>20</sup> The Environmental Addendum, which DOE/FE explained was “not required by ... NEPA,”<sup>21</sup> briefly summarized unconventional natural gas production activities, then discussed the potential environmental impacts of such activities based on a review of existing literature, regulations, and best management practices. DOE/FE cautioned that “[f]undamental uncertainties constrain the ability to predict what, if any, domestic natural gas production would be induced by granting any specific authorization ... to export LNG ....”<sup>22</sup>

DOE/FE issued the Non-FTA Order on May 12, 2015, granting the authorization requested by Cheniere Corpus Christi, addressing Sierra Club’s arguments, and incorporating

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<sup>18</sup> Supplement to Application of Cheniere Marketing, LLC for Long-Term Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas to Non-Free Trade Countries 3, *Cheniere Marketing, LLC*, FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG (May 20, 2014).

<sup>19</sup> 79 Fed. Reg. 48,312, 48,312 (Aug. 15, 2014); see DOE, *Addendum to Environmental Review Documents Concerning Exports of Natural Gas from the United States* (Aug. 2014) [hereinafter Environmental Addendum], available at <http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/08/f18/Addendum.pdf>; DOE/FE & National Energy Technology Laboratory, *Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Perspective on Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas from the United States*, DOE/NETL-2014/1649 (May 29, 2014) [hereinafter LCA GHG Report], available at <http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/05/f16/Life%20Cycle%20GHG%20Perspective%20Report.pdf>; see also 79 Fed. Reg. 32,258 (June 4, 2014); 79 Fed. Reg. 32,260 (June 4, 2014).

<sup>20</sup> 79 Fed. Reg. at 32,261.

<sup>21</sup> 79 Fed. Reg. at 48,312.

<sup>22</sup> 79 Fed. Reg. at 32,259.

discussions of the LNG Export Study, the Environmental Addendum, and the LCA GHG Report. Sierra Club's Rehearing Request followed.

## **II. Sierra Club's Rehearing Request Fails to Overcome the NGA's Presumption that LNG Exports Are Consistent with the Public Interest**

### **A. LNG Exports Are Presumptively Consistent with the Public Interest**

As DOE/FE properly found, Section 3 of the NGA creates a rebuttable presumption that a proposed LNG export is in the public interest, stating that DOE “*shall* issue such order upon application, *unless*, after opportunity for hearing, it finds that the proposed exportation or importation will not be consistent with the public interest.”<sup>23</sup> Sierra Club fruitlessly argues that no presumption applies here.<sup>24</sup> Even if the plain statutory text were somehow insufficient to show that Sierra Club is mistaken, judicial precedent would confirm as much: the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explained that “section 3 sets out a general presumption favoring such authorization, by language which requires approval of an application unless there is an express finding that the proposed activity would not be consistent with the public interest,” adding that Section 3 “therefore differs significantly from other sections under the NGA which condition agency approval upon a positive finding that the proposed activity will be in the public interest”<sup>25</sup> Likewise, the case that Sierra Club attempts to distinguish, *Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners' Association v. Energy Regulatory Administration* explicitly states that “§ 3 requires an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest to deny an application.”<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012) (emphases added); *see* Non-FTA Order at 12.

<sup>24</sup> *See* Reh'g Req. at 1–2.

<sup>25</sup> *W. Va. Pub. Servs. Comm'n v. U.S. Dept' of Energy*, 681 F.2d 847, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

<sup>26</sup> 822 F.2d 1105, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Sierra Club also argues that NEPA somehow nullifies the NGA Section 3 presumption.<sup>27</sup> Not so. “NEPA’s mandate ‘is essentially procedural.’”<sup>28</sup> The statute requires federal agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of proposed actions, but does not mandate substantive results such as conditioning the NGA Section 3 public interest inquiry on any particular environmental finding. Indeed, courts have emphasized that “NEPA is ‘not a suitable vehicle’ for airing grievances about the substantive policies adopted by an agency, as ‘NEPA was not intended to resolve fundamental policy disputes.’”<sup>29</sup>

## **B. NEPA Analyses for the Project Were Valid and Sufficient**

### **1. DOE Properly Fulfilled Its Role as a Cooperating Agency Under NEPA**

Sierra Club argues that DOE/FE should have issued its own EIS for the Project.<sup>30</sup> But Congress, through the Energy Policy Act of 2005, specifically instructed that FERC must serve as the lead agency for purposes of NEPA, and that other agencies must cooperate with FERC.<sup>31</sup> The lead agency has primary responsibility for preparing the NEPA environmental analysis document, and may request that other agencies having jurisdiction by law or special expertise serve as cooperating agencies.<sup>32</sup> A cooperating agency should participate in the NEPA process at the earliest possible time, and may comment on the lead agency’s analysis;<sup>33</sup> it “may adopt without recirculating the [EIS] of a lead agency when, after an independent review of the statement, the cooperating agency concludes that its comments and suggestions have been

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<sup>27</sup> See Reh’g Req. at 1.

<sup>28</sup> *Grunewald v. Jarvis*, 776 F.3d 893, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting *Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* (quoting *Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng*, 817 F.2d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

<sup>30</sup> See Reh’g Req. at 2–4.

<sup>31</sup> See Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 313(a)(3), 119 Stat. 594, 689 (2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)).

<sup>32</sup> See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5, 1501.6, 1508.5, 1508.16 (2014).

<sup>33</sup> See *id.* §§ 1501.6(b), 1503.2.

satisfied.”<sup>34</sup> Here, DOE/FE properly served as a cooperating agency under NEPA, adopted FERC’s Final EIS, and issued a Record of Decision under NEPA.<sup>35</sup>

## **2. The Putative Impacts of Emissions from Increased Domestic Natural Gas Production and Coal Consumption Allegedly Induced by the Project Are Not Cognizable Under NEPA**

In any event, the Rehearing Request’s NEPA discussion consists mostly of repeating an argument that both DOE/FE and FERC have consistently—and extensively—rejected in proceedings for both the Project and others like it,<sup>36</sup> namely that the NEPA analysis for any LNG export project must consider the putative impacts of emissions from increased domestic natural production and coal consumption allegedly induced by the LNG export project in question.<sup>37</sup> FERC, the lead NEPA agency, has reasonably explained that putative impacts of the sort alleged by Sierra Club are not cognizable under NEPA, regardless of whether they are viewed as “indirect effects” or “cumulative impacts.”<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *Id.* § 1506.3(c).

<sup>35</sup> *See* 80 Fed. Reg. 22,992 (Apr. 24, 2015); DOE/FE, *Record of Decision and Floodplain Statement of Findings for the Cheniere Marketing, LLC and Corpus Christi, LLC Application to Export Liquefied Natural Gas to Non-Free Trade Agreement Countries*, FE Docket No. 12-97-LNG (May 12, 2015).

<sup>36</sup> *See* Non-FTA Order at 10, 40–45, 192–95; *Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC & Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline, L.P.*, 149 FERC ¶ 61,283, at PP 118–122 (2014) [hereinafter FERC Order]; *Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC & Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline, L.P.*, 151 FERC ¶ 61,098, at PP 8–33 (2015) [hereinafter FERC Rehearing Order]; Final EIS at 4-211–4-213, *see also* *Dominion Cove Point LNG, LP, Final Opinion and Order Granting Long-Term, Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Cove Point LNG Terminal in Calvert County, Maryland, to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations* 5–6, 25–27, 82–95, DOE/FE Order No. 3331-A, FE Docket No. 11-128-LNG (May 7, 2015); *Freeport LNG Expansion, L.P. et al., Final Opinion and Order Granting Long-Term Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Freeport LNG Terminal on Quintana Island, Texas, to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations* 5, 83–94, DOE/FE Order No. 3357-B, FE Docket No. 11-161-LNG (Nov. 14, 2014); *Cameron LNG, LLC, Final Opinion and Order Granting Long-Term Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel from the Cameron LNG Terminal in Cameron Parish, Louisiana, to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations* 4, 22–23, 72–83, DOE/FE Order No. 3391-A, FE Docket No. 11-162-LNG (Sept. 10, 2014).

<sup>37</sup> *See* Reh’g Req. at 4–18.

<sup>38</sup> *See* FERC Reh’g Order at PP 8–33.



**a. The Putative Impacts that Sierra Club Alleges Are Not Cognizable Under NEPA as “Indirect Effects”**

NEPA requires an EIS to consider a proposed Federal action’s “indirect effects,” which are defined as effects that “are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed but are still reasonably foreseeable.”<sup>39</sup> Here, neither the foreseeability nor the causation requirement is met: the putative impacts of emissions from increased domestic natural gas production and coal consumption allegedly induced by the Project are too speculative to be cognizable as indirect effects under NEPA, and are also insufficiently causally related to any authorization under NGA Section 3 to be cognizable as indirect effects under NEPA.

**i. The Putative Impacts Sierra Club Alleges Are Overly Speculative**

As FERC explained, “[a]n effect is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ if it is ‘sufficiently likely to occur that a person of ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision.’”<sup>40</sup> But NEPA’s requirement to consider indirect effects does not require agencies to engage in overly “speculative” analyses of potential impacts.<sup>41</sup> (Sierra Club cites cases in support of an apparently contrary interpretation of the regulatory definition, but they are distinguishable as either (1) not actually involving “indirect effects” or (2) involving internally inconsistent reasoning by an agency.)<sup>42</sup> “[B]road statistical data discussing general national trends” are

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<sup>39</sup> 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16, 1508.8(b) (2014).

<sup>40</sup> FERC Reh’g Order at P 10 (quoting *City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth*, 420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir. 2005)).

<sup>41</sup> *E.g.*, *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989); *see, e.g.*, *City of Dallas v. Hall*, 562 F.3d 712, 719 (5th Cir. 2009) (NEPA analysis for wildlife refuge at site previously considered for reservoir was not required to consider indirect effects on water supply and urban planning, because such effects were “highly speculative” due to insufficient specificity in city’s reservoir plans and “uncertainty over whether the reservoir will be constructed and its impact on water supplies”).

<sup>42</sup> *See New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n*, 681 F.3d 471, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that, in determining whether EIS is required, an agency “generally must examine” whether “harm in question is so ‘remote and speculative’ as to reduce the effective probability of its occurrence to zero,” but not addressing indirect effects or reasonable foreseeability in setting this non-zero threshold); *San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n*, 449 F.3d 1016, 1031 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We find it difficult to reconcile the Commission’s

insufficient to create “reasonable foreseeability under NEPA.”<sup>43</sup> Rather, in order for an effect to be reasonably foreseeable instead of overly speculative, an agency must have at its disposal specific, quantifiable information regarding likely future impacts.<sup>44</sup> As FERC pointed out, Sierra Club’s argument that the Project will lead to impacts from emissions attributable to increased domestic natural gas consumption and coal consumption requires at least three levels of speculation: first, as to the “location and extent of potential subsequent production activity,” which are “unknown”; second, as to the “environmental impacts of such production”; and third, as to the impacts of theoretical “increased carbon dioxide emissions in the electric power sector.”<sup>45</sup>

The Final EIS explained that it was not possible to “estimate how much of the [Project’s] export volumes would come from current shale gas production and how much, if any, would be new production or development attributable to the Project,” which “does not depend on additional shale gas production which may occur for reasons unrelated to the Project”; further, “the location and subsequent activity is unknown and is too speculative to assume based on the interconnected interstate natural gas pipeline system,” so that “the factors necessary for a meaningful analysis of when, where, and how the development of shale gas would occur are

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conclusion that, as a matter of law, the possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear facility is ‘remote and speculative,’ with its stated efforts to undertake a ‘top to bottom’ security review against this same threat.”).

<sup>43</sup> *Coliseum Sq. Ass’n, Inc. v. Jackson*, 465 F.3d 215, 238 (5th Cir. 2006).

<sup>44</sup> *See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Board*, 668 F.3d 1067, 1079–82 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that Surface Transportation Board’s EIS for coal railroad was required to consider the impacts of coal mines and coal bed methane wells in the areas to be served by the railroad, because the agency had sufficiently specific information—the number of wells and associated infrastructure in each of the three counties to be served by the railroad, as well a map of future mine sites—for such impacts to be reasonably foreseeable rather than speculative); *Border Plant Working Group v. DOE*, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1027, 1028 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that agencies’ NEPA analyses for cross-border electric transmission lines were not required to consider putative indirect effect in form of subsequent increase in power plant emissions, because power plant expansion was “a speculative possibility, dependant on the market for electricity and other factors,” and because the record yielded “nothing to show that the specific operating details of [power] plants are reasonably foreseeable”).

<sup>45</sup> FERC Reh’g Order at PP 13, 17, 32.

unknown at this time.”<sup>46</sup> The situation here is thus very different from that in the cases Sierra Club relies on for the proposition that induced production *is* reasonably foreseeable, as the courts in those cases had been presented with far more certain information regarding indirect effects than is available here. *Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board* held that the Surface Transportation Board’s EIS for a coal railroad was arbitrary and capricious for failure to consider the railroad’s indirect effects in the form of emissions from coal-fired power plants.<sup>47</sup> But there the agency itself had said during the NEPA scoping process that it would “[e]valuate the potential air quality impacts associated with the increased availability and utilization of Powder River Basin Coal,”<sup>48</sup> and then inexplicably failed to do so in its EIS,<sup>48</sup> whereas here both FERC and DOE/FE have consistently maintained that indirect emissions are not reasonably foreseeable. Furthermore, in *Mid States Coalition*, the amount of coal being mined (and then burned) was known, and the demand for it had been acknowledged by the agency.<sup>49</sup> Here, there has been no specific prediction of how much natural gas production or fuel-switching to coal will be caused by the Liquefaction Project,<sup>50</sup> and the prospect of coal-switching has been made less—not more—likely by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulation under the Clean Air Act.<sup>51</sup> The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit distinguished *Mid States Coalition* because “[t]he court in *Mid States* concluded that adverse effects from the readily foreseeable increase in coal sales were certain to occur,” whereas in its case cumulative impacts were insufficiently foreseeable to be “capable of

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<sup>46</sup> Final EIS at 4-213.

<sup>47</sup> 345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2008).

<sup>48</sup> *Id.* at 550.

<sup>49</sup> *Id.* at 549.

<sup>50</sup> See FERC Reh’g Order at P 33.

<sup>51</sup> See *id.*; Non-FTA Order at 200.

meaningful discussion.”<sup>52</sup> In this case, both increased natural gas consumption and consequent increased emissions are far too speculative for *Mid States Coalition* to be on point, nor have there been inconsistent agency pronouncements on the subject. Similarly, in *High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service*, the court held that it was arbitrary and capricious for a NEPA analysis accompanying an agency rulemaking that was designed to “facilitate coal mining” both to “provide detailed estimates of the amount of coal to be mined ... and simultaneously claim that it would be too speculative to estimate emissions from ‘coal that may or may not be produced’ from ‘mines that may or may not be developed.’”<sup>53</sup> Again, there is no such specificity or inconsistency on a federal agency’s part here.

Unable to point to specific, quantifiable natural gas production induced by the Project, Sierra Club instead relies on “broad statistical data discussing general national trends” that are insufficient to create “reasonable foreseeability under NEPA.”<sup>54</sup> Sierra Club claims that the EIA Study “allow[s] DOE to predict ‘where, in what quantity, and under what circumstances’ exports will induce additional gas production.”<sup>55</sup> But DOE has already explained that, “[a]lthough the [EIA Study] made broad projections about the types of resources from which additional production may come, the [Environmental] Addendum stated that DOE cannot meaningfully estimate where, when, or by what particular method additional natural gas would be produced in response to non-FTA export demand.”<sup>56</sup> FERC has agreed that, while the model underlying the EIA Study “can be used to project the response of the U.S. energy markets to a wide variety of alternative assumptions and policies or policy initiatives, or to examine the impact of new energy

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<sup>52</sup> *Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 609 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2010).

<sup>53</sup> 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1184, 1196–97 (D. Colo. 2014).

<sup>54</sup> *Coliseum Sq. Ass’n*, 465 F.3d at 238.

<sup>55</sup> Reh’g Req. at 9.

<sup>56</sup> Non-FTA Order at 148.

programs and policies,” it is “not intended for predicting or analyzing the environmental impacts of specific infrastructure projects.”<sup>57</sup> The EIA Study itself cautioned that its projections were “not statements of what *will* happen but of what *might* happen, given the assumptions and methodologies used,” and “recognize[d] that projections of energy markets over a 25-year period are highly uncertain and subject to many events that cannot be foreseen ....”<sup>58</sup> Notably, the EIA Study indicated that domestic natural gas production from shale would increase or decrease based on supply and economic growth factors, even if no additional exports were to occur.<sup>59</sup> It is thus an oversimplification for Sierra Club to argue that a “belief that production will rise in response to exports is central to” authorizing the Project.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, the determinative effect of broader market conditions has been reflected in situations of actual commercial uncertainty for specific LNG terminals. DOE has cautioned that granting an authorization under NGA Section 3 “does not guarantee that a particular facility would be financed and built,” much less “that, even if built, market conditions would continue to favor export once the facility is operational”; indeed, “[n]umerous LNG import facilities were previously authorized by DOE, received financing, and were built, only to see declining use over the past decade.”<sup>61</sup> Sierra Club argues that this acknowledgment of market forces violates NEPA because it is an attempt to “exclude[] the direct effects of the action.”<sup>62</sup> In fact, DOE/FE made this statement about the Environmental

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<sup>57</sup> FERC Reh’g Order at P 15.

<sup>58</sup> EIA Report at ii, 3.

<sup>59</sup> *See id.*, App. B at Tables B1, B3, B5 (discussing four scenarios, and estimating the “baseline” amount of natural gas produced under each).

<sup>60</sup> Reh’g Req. at 4.

<sup>61</sup> 79 Fed. Reg. 32,258, 32,259 (June 4, 2014); *see, e.g., Oregon v. FERC*, 636 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2011) (involving bankruptcy of LNG import terminal).

<sup>62</sup> Reh’g Req. at 6.

Addendum, not the Project.<sup>63</sup> And in any event DOE/FE pointed to such market forces as adding to the uncertainties that “constrain [DOE/FE’s] ability to foresee and analyze with any particularity the incremental natural gas production that may be induced by permitting exports of LNG to non-FTA countries.”<sup>64</sup> There was no attempt on the agency’s part to avoid consideration of the Project’s direct impacts, which are thoroughly discussed in the Final EIS.

DOE/FE and FERC are also in agreement that the impacts of emissions from increased domestic natural gas production and coal consumption are not reasonably foreseeable indirect effects of NGA Section 3 authorizations for the Project.<sup>65</sup> As DOE/FE explained, it “cannot meaningfully analyze the specific environmental impacts of such production,”<sup>66</sup> and even the Environmental Addendum did “not attempt to identify or characterize the incremental environmental impacts that would result from LNG exports to non-FTA nations. Such impacts are not reasonably foreseeable and cannot be analyzed with any particularity.”<sup>67</sup> Sierra Club says that, even without specific information, the impacts of GHG emissions can be assessed because such impacts “generally do not depend on the geographic location of the emissions.”<sup>68</sup> This assertion actually reflects the inherently speculative nature of the inquiry that Sierra Club demands; it would require assessing the climate-change impacts of net GHG emissions changes worldwide attributable to the Project (exports from which Cheniere Corpus Christi believes

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<sup>63</sup> See Non-FTA Order at 193–94.

<sup>64</sup> *Id.* at 193.

<sup>65</sup> See *id.* at 9–10, 192–94, 200, 203.

<sup>66</sup> 79 Fed. Reg. at 32,259.

<sup>67</sup> Non-FTA Order at 193–94.

<sup>68</sup> Reh’g Req. at 11.

would displace more environmentally harmful fuels abroad).<sup>69</sup> The Final EIS explained that there is no methodology by which incremental effects can be assessed either locally or globally.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, the decisions of foreign sovereigns would have a determinative effect, a factor that Sierra Club admits to be highly speculative.<sup>71</sup> DOE/FE reasonably explained that “[t]he uncertainty associated with estimating” the various factors on which net global GHG emissions would depend would make the analysis “too speculative to inform the public interest in this or other non-FTA LNG export proceedings.”<sup>72</sup>

**ii. The Putative Impacts Sierra Club Alleges Are Insufficiently Causally Related to the Project**

In addition to not being reasonably foreseeable, the putative impacts alleged by Sierra Club are also not cognizable as indirect effects under NEPA because “[t]here is not the requisite reasonably close relationship between the impacts of future natural gas production and the ... Project.”<sup>73</sup>

“NEPA requires ‘a reasonably close causal relationship’ between the environmental effect and the alleged cause” in order “to make an agency responsible for a particular effect under NEPA.”<sup>74</sup> The Supreme Court has analogized to “the familiar doctrine of proximate cause from tort law,” explaining that “[s]ome effects that are ‘caused by’ a change in the physical

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<sup>69</sup> Non-FTA Application at 15; *see also* LCA GHG Report at 9 (stating that, “for most scenarios in both the European and Asian regions, the generation of power from imported natural gas has lower life cycle GHG emissions than power generation from regional coal”).

<sup>70</sup> Final EIS at 4-232.

<sup>71</sup> Reh’g Req. at 17. Somewhat relatedly, Sierra Club’s Rehearing Request asserts that “the majority of [the Project’s] output [is] contracted to Japanese and Indian buyers,” *id.* at 25, but this assertion is incorrect and appears to be a result of copying-and-pasting from one of Sierra Club’s many other filings in other FERC and DOE proceedings.

<sup>72</sup> Non-FTA Order at 203.

<sup>73</sup> FERC Reh’g Order at P 12.

<sup>74</sup> *Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen*, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting *Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy*, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)).

environment in the sense of ‘but for’ causation, will nonetheless not fall within [42 U.S.C. § 4332] because the causal chain is too attenuated.”<sup>75</sup> Thus, “a ‘but for’ causal relationship is insufficient to make an agency responsible for a particular effect under NEPA ....”<sup>76</sup> To determine whether an agency must consider a particular effect, courts must “look to the underlying policies or legislative intent in order to draw a manageable line between those causal changes that may make an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.”<sup>77</sup> Thus, in *Public Citizen* the Court held that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s environmental assessment for safety regulations applicable to Mexican trucks—which would newly be permitted to operate in the United States following the President’s lifting of a moratorium—was only required to evaluate the effects of the regulations themselves (e.g., emissions during roadside inspections), and not the broader effects of the Mexican trucks’ newfound U.S. presence, which the agency had no discretion to prevent.<sup>78</sup> Applying NEPA’s “rule of reason,” the Court found that requiring the agency to consider broader effects would not provide “useful” information that served the purpose of informed decision-making.<sup>79</sup>

Notwithstanding this binding authority, Sierra Club relies exclusively on a lengthy chain of but-for causation in arguing that the DOE/FE violated NEPA, arguing that a DOE/FE order under NGA Section 3 will lead to increased domestic natural gas production, which will lead to increased domestic emissions and increased domestic coal consumption, which will lead to yet more domestic emissions, which will lead to a net increase in global emissions. This lengthy and

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<sup>75</sup> *Metro. Edison*, 460 U.S. at 774.

<sup>76</sup> *Pub. Citizen*, 541 U.S. at 767.

<sup>77</sup> *Metro. Edison*, 460 U.S. at 774 n.7.

<sup>78</sup> *See* 541 U.S. at 768–69 (holding that requiring agency to consider the environmental effects of the entry of Mexican trucks would not fulfill NEPA’s purposes of informed decision-making and disclosure).

<sup>79</sup> *Id.* at 767, 768.



speculative chain of causation between an order under NGA Section 3 and a potential net increase in worldwide emissions depends on an activity—domestic natural gas production—that “may occur for reasons unrelated to the Project” and over which the NGA gives DOE/FE and FERC “no jurisdiction” by congressional design.<sup>80</sup> Instead, natural gas exploration, production, and gathering, and the facilities used for these activities, are subject to extensive regulation by state and local agencies (as well as increasingly by EPA).<sup>81</sup> In light of this legislative intent, and just as in *Public Citizen*, DOE/FE and FERC should not be deemed to have “caused”—and therefore to be responsible under NEPA for considering—effects that may occur regardless of their actions, and over which Congress did not intend them to have any control.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Non-FTA Order at 42 (quoting Final EIS at 4-213); see 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012) (stating NGA “shall not apply to ... the production or gathering of natural gas”); see also *Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.*, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1596 (2015) (“The Act leaves regulation of other portions of the industry—such as production, local distribution facilities, and direct sales—to the States.”).

<sup>81</sup> See Non-FTA Order at 196–97.

<sup>82</sup> See *Pub. Citizen*, 541 U.S. at 752; *Town of Barnstable, Mass. v. FAA*, 740 F.3d 681, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that agency was not required to prepare EIS for hazard analysis concerning wind farm, because it had “no authority to countermand Interior’s approval of the project or to require changes to the project in response to environmental concerns”); see also *Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 746 F.3d 698, 709, 710 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ NEPA analysis for a Clean Water Act permit related to coal mining operation was not required to consider effects of entire mining operation in light of “Congress’s intent to place primary responsibility for surface mining with state regulators,” and stating that “agencies may reasonably limit their NEPA review to only those effects proximately caused by the actions over which they have regulatory responsibility”); *Hall*, 562 F.3d at 719 (“[T]he effects of establishing the refuge, and thus precluding the reservoir, are highly speculative and cannot be shown to be the proximate cause of future water shortages ...”); *N.J. Dep’t of Env’tl. Prot. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n*, 561 F.3d 132, 139, 140 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s EIS for nuclear power facility re-licensing application was not required to consider effects of terrorist airplane attacks, because Congress empowered Nuclear Regulatory Commission to determine “whether equipment within a facility is suitable for continued operation or could withstand an accident, but ... no authority over the airspace above its facilities,” meaning that the prospect of “a terrorist attack lengthens the causal chain beyond the ‘reasonably close causal relationship’ required” under NEPA); *City of Shoreacres*, 420 F.3d at 452 (holding that U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ EIS for a permit associated with construction of a ship terminal was not required to consider the effects of hypothetical future deepening of the ship channel, and stating that, “if the rationale of *Public Citizen* is applicable, the deepening of the Houston Ship Channel, if it ever occurs, would not be treated as [an] ‘indirect effect’ ‘caused’ by the Corps’ decision to grant a ... permit to the Port,” because the ship channel could “only be deepened by an Act of Congress, not any decision by the Corps.”); cf. *Sierra Club v. Mainella*, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 104 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that National Park Service’s NEPA analyses for directional oil and gas drilling activities occurring—on the surface—outside of a preserve were nevertheless required to consider impacts outside the preserve under *Public Citizen*, because agency had “the ability ... to prevent the activities causing the environmental impact by denying access to the Preserve”).

Sierra Club cites *Save our Sonoran v. Flowers* for the proposition that the Project's NEPA analysis was nevertheless required to treat emissions from increased domestic natural gas production and coal consumption as a cognizable indirect effect, regardless of the tenuous chain of causation between the Project and those activities (over which DOE/FE and FERC have no control).<sup>83</sup> *Save our Sonoran* held that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' NEPA environmental assessment for a permit to fill in 7.5 acres of natural waterways as part of a 608-acre residential development project should have considered the permit's effects on the entirety of the parcel to be developed, and not just the 31.3 acres of natural waterways running through it.<sup>84</sup> Crucial to this holding was the fact that "the project could not go forward" without the permit; instead, "denial of a permit would prevent the site from developing in a manner consistent with the developer's purpose."<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, "[b]ecause the jurisdictional waters run throughout the property like capillaries through tissue, any development the Corps permit[ted] would have an effect on the whole property."<sup>86</sup> The court accordingly concluded that "*Public Citizen's* causal nexus requirement is satisfied," and that "[t]he NEPA analysis should have included the entire property."<sup>87</sup> Section 3 of the NGA provides no such power over natural gas production.

While exhaustively attacking putative impacts of emissions from increased domestic natural gas production and coal consumption allegedly induced by the Project, Sierra Club devotes very little attention to the fact that emissions from existing and new coal-fired electric power generation, rather than only being susceptible to basic market principles, are increasingly

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<sup>83</sup> Reh'g Req. at 11 (citing 408 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005)).

<sup>84</sup> See 408 F.3d at 1118, 1121–22.

<sup>85</sup> *Id.* at 1119, 1122.

<sup>86</sup> *Id.* at 1122.

<sup>87</sup> *Id.*

subject to EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act.<sup>88</sup> DOE/FE explained that EPA rulemaking would have a significant impact on potential coal-switching: “If and when finalized, these proposed rules have the potential to mitigate significantly any increased emissions from the U.S. electric power sector that would otherwise result from increased use of coal, and perhaps to negate those increased emissions entirely.”<sup>89</sup> EPA has also promulgated new source performance standards for emissions from natural-gas processing plants.<sup>90</sup> While Sierra Club faults DOE/FE for not speculating as to the specific impact that recent EPA rulemakings would have (should they be finalized in some form),<sup>91</sup> their mere proposals further confirm that authorizations for the Project under NGA Section 3 are insufficiently causally connected to the putative impacts alleged by Sierra Club for those impacts to be cognizable as “indirect effects” of the Project under NEPA.

**b. The Putative Impacts that Sierra Club Alleges Are Not Cognizable Under NEPA as “Cumulative Impacts”**

Sierra Club’s Rehearing Request appears to argue that the putative impacts of emissions from increased domestic natural gas production and coal consumption allegedly induced by the

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<sup>88</sup> See *Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA*, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (upholding EPA’s decision to require Best Available Control Technology for greenhouse gas emissions from existing stationary sources otherwise subject to Prevention of Significant Deterioration permitting under Clean Air Act); see also 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014) (proposing performance standards for new fossil fuel-direct electric utility generating units); 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) (proposing emission guidelines for states to follow in developing plans to address greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units); 79 Fed. Reg. 34,960 (June 18, 2014) (proposing standards of performance for emissions of greenhouse gases from modified and reconstructed fossil fuel-fired electric utility generation units); 79 Fed. Reg. 65,482 (Nov. 4, 2014) (proposing supplemental emission guidelines for U.S. territories and Indian country regarding greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric generating units).

<sup>89</sup> See Non-FTA Order at 200.

<sup>90</sup> See 76 Fed. Reg. 52,738 (Aug. 23, 2011) (proposing rule); 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (publishing final rule); see also Non-FTA Order at 176–77, 196–97 (discussing EPA rulemaking).

<sup>91</sup> See Reh’g Req. at 17.

Project are separately cognizable under NEPA as “cumulative impacts.”<sup>92</sup> This is incorrect. Cumulative impact is “the *impact* on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.”<sup>93</sup> Thus, an agency’s “obligation under NEPA to consider cumulative impacts is confined to impacts that are ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”<sup>94</sup> As discussed above, the impacts of emissions from increased natural gas production and coal consumption theoretically induced by LNG exports are not reasonably foreseeable under NEPA. Therefore, the Final EIS’s cumulative impact analysis was not required to consider them.<sup>95</sup>

### **3. DOE’s Environmental Addendum and LCA GHG Report Were Not Required by NEPA**

Sierra Club also argues that the Environmental Addendum and LCA GHG Report “are not a substitute for NEPA review.”<sup>96</sup> Cheniere Corpus Christi agrees, but only because—as DOE/FE explained—the documents in question were neither required by NEPA nor intended to be elements of the NEPA review process for the Project.<sup>97</sup> The Environmental Addendum and LCA GHG Report provide useful generalized analyses, but do not attempt to provide specific, quantifiable information for a particular LNG export project. As to the Environmental Addendum, DOE/FE explained that “[f]undamental uncertainties constrain the ability to predict what, if any, domestic natural gas production would be induced by granting any specific [export]

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<sup>92</sup> See, e.g., *id.* at 7 (“Similarly, authorities interpreting the obligation to discuss ‘cumulative effects’ explain that uncertainty is only a ground for excluding an effect from NEPA review when the effect is so uncertain that it is not susceptible to ‘meaningful discussion’ at the time of the analysis.”).

<sup>93</sup> 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2014) (emphasis added); see *Del. Riverkeeper Network v. FERC*, 753 F.3d 1304, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cumulative impacts analysis should consider “‘expected impacts from these other actions’”) (quoting *Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA*, 290 F.3d 339, 345 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).

<sup>94</sup> *City of Shoreacres*, 420 F.3d at 453; see also FERC Reh’g Order at P 25.

<sup>95</sup> See, e.g., *Town of Cave Creek, Ariz. v. FAA*, 325 F.3d 320, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding cumulative impact analysis was not required to include “difficult ... as well as increasingly inaccurate ... projections”).

<sup>96</sup> Reh’g Req. at 3.

<sup>97</sup> Non-FTA Order at 7, 147.

authorization,” that the Environmental Addendum could not “meaningfully” analyze either the specific existence or impacts of induced natural gas production, and therefore that “environmental impacts resulting from production activity induced by LNG exports ... are not ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”<sup>98</sup> As to the LCA GHG Report, DOE/FE explained that it “does not fulfill any NEPA requirements in this proceeding, nor has DOE/FE made any suggestion to that effect,” and that it “addresses foreign GHG emissions and thus goes beyond the scope of what must be reviewed under NEPA.”<sup>99</sup> Ultimately, as FERC noted, the mere fact that DOE/FE commissions a projection of LNG exports’ hypothetical effects does not imbue those effects with reasonable foreseeability such that they are cognizable under NEPA; rather, such generalized projections do not provide the requisite specificity for “reasonably estimating how much of [the] Project’s export volumes will come from current versus future natural gas production, or where and when the future production may specifically be located, much less any associated environmental impacts.”<sup>100</sup>

#### **4. Sierra Club’s Remaining Arguments Are Likewise Unavailing**

The rest of Sierra Club’s Rehearing Request is devoted largely to non-NEPA arguments that (like Sierra Club’s NEPA arguments) lack much specificity to the Project, such as criticisms of the methodologies underlying the LNG Export Study, Environmental Addendum, and LCA GHG Report.<sup>101</sup> (For instance, the Rehearing Request does not discuss CMI’s May 2014 supplement to the NERA Report.) DOE/FE has addressed such arguments before, including in the Non-FTA Order.

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<sup>98</sup> 79 Fed. Reg. at 32,259.

<sup>99</sup> Non-FTA Order at 183.

<sup>100</sup> FERC Reh’g Order at P 17.

<sup>101</sup> *See* Reh’g Req. at 18–26.

With regard to Sierra Club’s arguments that DOE/FE has an obligation to evaluate nationwide effects under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”),<sup>102</sup> these too miss the mark, because FERC is “the lead agency for purposes of coordinating all applicable Federal authorizations.”<sup>103</sup> Furthermore, neither the ESA nor the NHPA require the kind of nationwide assessment on which Sierra Club insists.

Section 7 of the ESA requires Federal agencies to “insure,” through consultation with expert agencies, that their actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such species.”<sup>104</sup> In evaluating an action’s effects on listed species and their habitat, the agencies must consider both the area directly and indirectly affected by the action itself, as well as “the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent.”<sup>105</sup> But effects under the ESA are more restrictively defined than under NEPA: “indirect effects” and “cumulative effects” must both be “reasonably certain to occur” under the ESA,<sup>106</sup> a standard that courts have interpreted as applying in narrower circumstances than NEPA’s reasonable foreseeability standard.<sup>107</sup> Thus, for the same reasons that induced additional natural gas production is not a cognizable effect under NEPA, it is also not a cognizable effect under the ESA. Furthermore, the ESA defines “interrelated actions” as “those that are part of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification,” and “interdependent actions” as

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<sup>102</sup> See *id.* at 26–27.

<sup>103</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.07 (2014) (allowing for lead agency designation in ESA consultation process).

<sup>104</sup> 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).

<sup>105</sup> 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2014).

<sup>106</sup> *Id.*

<sup>107</sup> See, e.g., *Medina County Env'tl. Action Ass'n v. STB*, 602 F.3d 687 at 702 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that the NEPA standard “applies in a broader set of circumstances but encompasses the ‘cumulative effects’ standard under the ESA—actions ‘reasonably certain to occur’ are also ‘reasonably foreseeable’”).

“those that have no independent utility apart from the action under consideration.”<sup>108</sup> As noted, additional natural gas production is likely to occur independent of the Project,<sup>109</sup> and thus cannot be considered “interrelated” or “interdependent” with the Project for purposes of ESA analysis.

Nor does the NHPA require consideration of nationwide effects. It directs Federal agencies to “take into account the effect” of their actions “on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.”<sup>110</sup> The goal of the process is to “assess” an action’s “effects and seek ways to avoid, minimize or mitigate any adverse effects on historic properties.”<sup>111</sup> The pertinent analysis area is “the geographic area or areas within which an undertaking may directly or indirectly cause alterations in the character or use of historic properties,” and can vary depending on the nature of the action.<sup>112</sup> Just as with NEPA, however, indirect and cumulative effects must be both “reasonably foreseeable” and “caused by” the Federal action.<sup>113</sup> Thus, for the reasons discussed above with respect to NEPA, inducement of additional gas production falls outside of the scope of what must be considered under the NHPA.

### **III. Sierra Club Has Failed to Establish that It is Entitled to a Stay of the Non-FTA Order**

Sierra Club’s Rehearing Request has certainly not justified the “extraordinary remedy” of a stay.<sup>114</sup> A plaintiff seeking a stay in Federal court must prove that: (1) it is likely to prevail on the merits; (2) it will likely suffer irreparable harm if a stay is denied; (3) no other party will

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<sup>108</sup> 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

<sup>109</sup> See Final EIS at 4-213.

<sup>110</sup> 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2012).

<sup>111</sup> 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(a) (2014).

<sup>112</sup> *Id.* § 800.16(d).

<sup>113</sup> *Id.* § 800.5(a)(1).


<sup>114</sup> *Cuomo v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n*, 772 F.2d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).

suffer substantial harm if a stay is granted; and (4) the public interest favors a stay.<sup>115</sup> As discussed above, Sierra Club's arguments are inadequate to show a likelihood that it would prevail on the merits of a judicial challenge. Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently denied a request for a stay of a FERC order authorizing an LNG terminal under NGA Section 3, with the Petitioner having raised very similar arguments to those in Sierra Club's rehearing request.<sup>116</sup> Furthermore, Sierra Club's assertion that it would be harmed in the absence of a stay is highly implausible, given that the Project's first liquefaction train is not currently expected to be ready for start-up until 2019.<sup>117</sup> Finally, the public interest does not favor a stay, because both DOE/FE and FERC have concluded that the Project is in the public interest.<sup>118</sup>

#### IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Sierra Club's Rehearing Request should be denied in its entirety, and the Non-FTA Order should not be stayed.

Respectfully submitted,



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Dated: June 26, 2015

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<sup>115</sup> See *Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc.*, 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

<sup>116</sup> See *Earth Reports, Inc. v. FERC*, No. 15-1127 (D.C. Cir. June 12, 2015) (order denying emergency motion for stay pending judicial review).

<sup>117</sup> See Initial Implementation Plan-A, *Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC & Cheniere Corpus Christi Pipeline, L.P.*, FERC Docket Nos. CP12-507-000 & CP12-508-000 (Dec. 31, 2014).

<sup>118</sup> See Non-FTA Order at 214; FERC Order at P 3.




**VERIFICATION**

State of New York )

County of New York )

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Lisa M. Toner, who, having been by me first duly sworn, on oath says: that she is the Attorney for Cheniere Marketing, LLC and Corpus Christi Liquefaction, LLC, and is duly authorized to make this Verification; that she has read the foregoing instrument; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of her knowledge, information and belief.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Lisa M. Toner

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on the 26<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2015.

Name:   
Title: Notary Public


My Commission expires:

**McCALLUM GEORGE DIONNE**  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 01MC6249522  
Qualified in Queens County  
~~Commission Expires Oct. 11, 2015~~

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing document upon each person designated on the official service list compiled by the Secretary in these proceedings.

Dated at New York, N.Y., this 26<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2015.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Dionne McCallum-George  
*Legal Secretary on behalf of  
Cheniere Marketing, LLC and Corpus  
Christi Liquefaction, LLC*